Hilary Putnam has offered two arguments to show that we cannotbe brains in a vat, and one to show that our cognitive situationcannot be fully analogous to that of brains in a vat. The latterand one of the former are irreparably flawed by misapplicationsof, or mistaken inferences from, his semantic externalism; thethird yields only a simple logical truth. The metaphysical realismthat is Putnam’s ultimate target is perfectly consistent withsemantic externalism.

Hilary Putnam has offered two arguments to show that we cannotbe brains in a vat, and one to show that our cognitive situationcannot be fully analogous to that of brains in a vat. The latterand one of the former are irreparably flawed by misapplicationsof, or mistaken inferences from, his semantic externalism; thethird yields only a simple logical truth. The metaphysical realismthat is Putnams ultimate target is perfectly consistent withsemantic externalism.

Dogmatists often exploit the skeptical argument based on the brains-in-a-vat scenario as a test case for their epistemological enterprises. I argue that this ‘argument’ does not deserve our attention, so it should not be used as a test case. I first show that the possibilities of empirical knowledge and of skeptical scenarios are inconsistent. If so, the BIV-skeptic must make the case for preferring such scenarios over the possibility of empirical knowledge. The central argument of my paper is that the (...) BIV-skeptic can neither rely on any selection principle for this purpose, nor can she claim that she needs no such principle. Then I will show that we can even dispense with the Inconsistency Thesis: if the skeptic wishes, she may allow for the possibility of empirical knowledge. The essay concludes with considering the morals of the above argument for the dogmatist endeavor. (shrink)

This paper concerns the relation between two metaethical theses: moral naturalism and moral skepticism. It is important that we distinguish both from a couple of methodological principles with which they might be confused. Let us give the label “Cartesian skepticism” to the method of subjecting to doubt everything for which it is possible to do so—usually by introducing alternative hypotheses that are consistent with all available evidence (e.g., brains in vats). Let us give the label “global naturalism” to the (...) principle that requires of any item which we admit into our ontology that it “fits” (in some manner or cluster of manners to be specified) with our naturalistic scientific worldview. One might be both a Cartesian skeptic and a global naturalist, if the latter principle is something that has survived the former test procedure. Alternatively, one might have adopted global naturalism for some other reason, while having little patience for the Cartesian method of doubt. Moral naturalism is the metaethical view that moral entities (e.g., properties like goodness and evil) fit within the scientific image of the world. The moral naturalist will probably be a global naturalist, but need not be: It is consistent with allowing non-natural entities into one’s ontology that one happens to think that moral properties are of the natural variety. Moral skepticism denies that moral entities fit within our scientific worldview. One way of denying moral naturalism is to be a moral error theorist: to hold that our moral discourse attempts to make reference to moral properties, but these properties do not exist.1 Another way of denying moral naturalism is to be a noncognitivist: to hold that our moral discourse was never really in the business of referring to moral facts or properties in the first place, and ipso facto such facts or properties are not naturalistic. In this paper, the label “moral skepticism” denotes the disjunction of these two theses. Neither the error theorist nor the noncognitivist must be committed to global naturalism, but usually will be; indeed, this commitment will often be a motivating factor of their metaethical views.. (shrink)

This book focuses on the impact of technology on taxation and deals with the broad effect of technology on diverse taxation systems. It addresses the highly relevant eTax issue and argues that while VAT may not be the ultimate solution with regard to taxing electronic commerce, it can be demonstrated to be the most effective solution to date. The book analyzes the application and the effectiveness of traditional income tax principles in contradistinction to VAT principles. Taking into account rapidly ameliorating (...) technology, the book next assesses the compatibility between electronic commerce and diverse systems of taxation. Using case studies of Amazon.com and Second Life, as well as additional practical examples, the book demonstrates the effectiveness of VAT in respect of electronic commerce and ameliorating technology in the incalculable and borderless realm of cyberspace. (shrink)

It’s pretty standard to find pretty compelling the claim that for all one can tell one may be a vat‐brain: not least, to say the least, because it’s a version of Descartes’ demon thought‐experiment in the First Meditation. Here I refute that claim. Like Descartes I start with the idea that one has an undeniable grip on most of what one is thinking. To this I add the idea that knowing thinking as thinking is being able to engage in it. (...) Then I argue that one can’t engage in the (purported) thinking of a vat‐brain (there are various specimens of vat‐brain to be considered). The essential point is that one cannot make anything of what a vat‐brain’s intended ontology would be, and how the brain might conceive of it. So one cannot engage with any vat‐brain’s (purported) thinking. Yet one engages with one’s own. So one isn’t any of them. I’m not, anyway: you can speak for yourself. (shrink)

Thought experiments involving The Matrix, brains-in-vats, or Cartesian demons have traditionally thought to describe skeptical possibilities. Chalmers has denied this, claiming that the simulations involved are real enough to at least sometimes defeat the skeptic. Through an examination of the meaning of kind terms in natural language I argue that, though the Chalmers view may be otherwise attractive, it is not an antidote to skepticism.

Putnam's argument that we are not brains in a VAT has recently seen a resurgence in interest. Although objections to it are legion, an emerging consensus seems to be that even if it successfully refutes one version of the brain in a VAT scenario, lifelong envatment, it is powerless against a different one, recent envatment. Although initially appealing, I argue in this paper that this response-merely replacing lifelong envatment by recent envatment-is a bad response to Putnam's argument. Yet there is (...) a different version of the brain in a VAT scenario, recent memory-altering envatment, that Putnam's argument does not refute and is also sufficiently radical. The crucial issue turns out to be which epistemic sources sceptical scenarios may attack. I argue that there's no convincing reason for exempting memory from the sceptical attack: Sceptical scenarios must target memory to be sufficiently radical and they can do so without violating any constraint on sceptical scenarios. In the end Putnam's argument doesn't fail because of some 'deep' philosophical mistake, but because it overlooks how flexible and adjustable sceptical scenarios are. (shrink)

This article investigates the practice of vat en sit to offer solutions to church councils of the mainly Black Reformed Churches in South Africa and also to the couples and families involved in such a relationship. Vat en sit is fast becoming a common phenomenon in South Africa. It should be noted that some of the couples in the vat-en-sit relationships may enter into it with no formal agreement. However, there are partners who may enter into this kind of relationship (...) through a universal partnership agreement whereby the couple plan to live together without marrying one another or a domestic life-partnership agreement whereby the couple opt to regulate their rights and duties in a vat-en-sit relationship. It does not, however, affect only the black members of the Reformed Churches in South Africa but also the family structures of society. The article thus endeavours to determine the reasons why many couples go this route and also how church councils could be assisted in dealing with the issue of vat en sit. This concept will be disseminated under the following headings: The causes of vat en sit relationships Implications of vat en sit The effect of a vat-en-sit relationship in the church The solution to the issue of vat en sit is to assist church councils, couples and their immediate and extended families. (shrink)

It may be of interest to supplement the latter part of Professor Conway's article by a note applying the same standards to estimating the value of the other sources on which we have to rely for our knowledge of the Spirensian tradition. Apart from ‘L’ and Harl. 2684 Luchs used for this purpose three partially Spirensian sources: the one fourteenth-century and four fifteenth-century MSS whose archetype he called ‘R’ V, the fifteenth-century Vat. Pal. 876, and the fifteenth-century Flor. Laur. lxxxix. (...) inf. 1. The last mentioned may be dismissed as practically valueless and as supplying little more than new corruptions from an unusually contaminated intermediary. In addition to these deteriores Luchs used the Agennensis , but only for the Spirensian supplement in Book xxvi' and for the last part of Book xxx . He did not deal at all with the Spirensian textual correctors in A. (shrink)

Nick Bostrom’s recently patched ‘‘simulation argument’’ (Bostrom in Philos Q 53:243–255, 2003; Bos- trom and Kulczycki in Analysis 71:54–61, 2011) purports to demonstrate the probability that we ‘‘live’’ now in an ‘‘ancestor simulation’’—that is as a simulation of a period prior to that in which a civilization more advanced than our own—‘‘post-human’’—becomes able to simulate such a state of affairs as ours. As such simulations under consid- eration resemble ‘‘brains in vats’’ (BIVs) and may appear open to similar objections, (...) the paper begins by reviewing objections to BIV-type proposals, specifically those due a presumed mad envatter. In counter example, we explore the motivating rationale behind current work in the development of psychologically realistic social simula- tions. Further concerns about rendering human cognition in a computational medium are confronted through review of current dynamic systems models of cognitive agency. In these models, aspects of the human condition are repro- duced that may in other forms be considered incomputable, i.e., political voice, predictive planning, and consciousness. The paper then argues that simulations afford a unique potential to secure a post-human future, and may be nec- essary for a pre-post-human civilization like our own to achieve and to maintain a post-human situation. Long-s- tanding philosophical interest in tools of this nature for Aristotle’s ‘‘statesman’’ and more recently for E.O. Wilson in the 1990s is observed. Self-extinction-level threats from State and individual levels of organization are compared, and a likely dependence on large-scale psychologically realistic simulations to get past self-extinction-level threats is projected. In the end, Bostrom’s basic argument for the conviction that we exist now in a simulation is reaffirmed. (shrink)

Philosophy and science employ abstract hypothetical scenarios- thought experiments - to illustrate, defend, and dispute theoretical claims. Since thought experiments furnish no new empirical observations, the method prompts two epistemological questions: whether anything may be learnt from the merely hypothetical, and, if so, how. Various sceptical arguments against the use of thought experiments in philosophy are discussed and criticized. The thesis that thought experiments in science provide a priori knowledge through non-sensory grasping of abstract entities is discussed and rejected. The (...) thesis that thought experimentation consists in manipulations of mental models is examined and found to be of limited epistemological relevance. It is argued that thought experiments are associated with characteristic arguments in a manner similar to ordinary experiments. It is further argued that thought experiments function in the same way as experiments in general: by providing premises for their associated arguments. Like other experiments, a thought experiment is successful when the premises it provides are true. This holds both for philosophical and scientific thought experiments. An argument schema is proposed and shown to be a formal analogue to that associated with ordinary experiments; similar in being subject to epistemological holism; but differing in being modal: in employing statements about possibility and necessity. The evaluation of thought experiments thus depends on how modal statements may be justified. Intuition and conceivability are discussed as sources of modal justification and found problematic. Instead it is suggested that evaluation proceed by accommodation of the statements describing the experiment's hypothetical scenario. The method of accommodation is developed and applied to five influential thought experiments in philosophy: the brain in a vat; Putnam's Twin Earth; Burge's arthritis example; Searle's Chinese Room; and Newcomb's problem. Its application shows some of these to be failed, others to be successful only relative to controversial philosophical doctrines. (shrink)

Various theorists contend that we may live in a computer simulation. David Chalmers in turn argues that the simulation hypothesis is a metaphysical hypothesis about the nature of our reality, rather than a sceptical scenario. We use recent work on consciousness to motivate new doubts about both sets of arguments. First, we argue that if either panpsychism or panqualityism is true, then the only way to live in a simulation may be as brains-in-vats, in which case it is unlikely (...) that we live in a simulation. We then argue that if panpsychism or panqualityism is true, then viable simulation hypotheses are substantially sceptical scenarios. We conclude that the nature of consciousness has wide-ranging implications for simulation arguments. (shrink)

Many philosophy majors are shocked by the gap between the relative ease of lower-level philosophy courses and the difficulty of upper-division courses. This book serves as a necessary bridge to upper-level study in philosophy by offering rigorous but concise and accessible accounts of basic concepts and distinctions that are used throughout the discipline. It serves as a valuable advanced introduction to any undergraduate who is moving into upper-level courses in philosophy. While lower-level introductions to philosophy usually deal with popular topics (...) accessible to the general student in a piecemeal fashion, The Philosophy Major's Introduction to Philosophy offers coverage of important general philosophical concepts, tools, and devices that may be used for a long time to come in various philosophical areas. The volume is helpfully divided between a focus on the relation between language and the world in the first three chapters and coverage of mental content in the final two chapters, but builds a coherent narrative from start to finish. It also provides ample study questions and helpful sign-posts throughout, making it a must-have for any student attempting to engage fully with the problems and arguments in philosophy. Key Features Integrates topics from various areas of philosophy, such as philosophy of language, metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, and philosophical logic Provides descriptions of logico-mathematical tools necessary for philosophical studies, such as propositional logic, predicate logic, modal logic, set theory, mereology, and mathematical functions Makes connections with modern philosophy, including discussions of Descartes's skepticism and dualism, Locke's theory of personal identity, Hume's theory of causation, and Kant's synthetic a priori. Includes well-known entertaining puzzles and thought experiments such as the Ship of Theseus, the Statue and the Clay, a Brain in a Vat, and Twin Earth Lists helpful Exercise Questions and Discussion Questions at the end of each chapter and answers selected questions at the back of the book. (shrink)

The history of the Qurʾānic text begins with the time of its revelation. The research on Qurʾānic manuscripts is one of the main fields of textual studies of the Qurʾān. There have been many works done by both Muslim and Western scholars. Many museums and libraries around the world hold Qurʾān manuscripts. Each manuscript has its own characteristics such as orthography, calligraphy, decoration, and binding, number of the pages and the lines, and dating. This article deals with 110 Qurʾān manuscripts (...) found in the Vatican Library (Biblioteca Apostalica Vaticana) at the Vaticani arabi, Borgiani arabi,Barberiniani orientaliand RossianiCollections. The dates of these Qurʾān manuscripts vary from I/VII(?) and XIII/XIX centuries. The article aims to identify the features of Qurʾānic writing by studying chronologically some basic physical-content descriptions and characteristics of these manuscripts. It also examines the different names of the sūrahs and the knowledge on Meccan or Medinan sūrahs presented on the sūrah headings of manuscripts. Summary: Each Qurʾān manuscript has its own characteristics. These features present significant insights into the field of history of Qurʾānic text. A manuscript becomes a source for the history of writing muṣḥafin terms of physical and content features such as calligraphy, ink colors, binding, and explanations found in katabapage, the sūrah headings which contain the names of sūrahs, Meccan-Medinan knowledge, the numbers of āyahs, and the signs for juzʾ, ʿashr, and ḥizb. The research on the names of sūrahs, Meccan-Medinan knowledge, and the number of āyahs contributes to the ʿulūm al-Qurʾānstudies as well. This article examines 110 Qurʾān manuscripts located in the Vatican Library in the Vaticani arabi(73 MSS), Borgiani arabi (25 MSS),Barberiniani orientali(11 MSS), and Rossiani(2 MSS) Collections. Each manuscript is individually studied. However, due to the limitation of the article, I include only some basic and significant physical and content features of these manuscripts. The catalogues prepared by Giorgio Levi della Vida (1886-1967) and Carlo Alberto Anzuini are consulted for this study. I also study the sūrah headings in Qurʾān manuscripts which contain the names of sūrahs and Meccan-Medinan knowledge. The most used calligraphy types of these manuscripts coming from different geographies are maghribī(19 MSS) and nasikh-Ottoman (66 MSS). The basic features of maghribīMSS as follows: The text is written dark brown, vowel signs in dark red, shaddaand jazmin blue, and hamzain orange ink (VI-VII/XII-XIII centuries). The āyah endings are in circle form and decorated (VI-VII/XII-XIII centuries). The same characteristics can be seen in the next centuries (VIII/XIV and IX/XV centuries). The word sajdais written in the same line with the sajdaayah in Borg. Ar. 51 (VI-VII/XII-XIII centuries). The main characteristics of nasikh-Ottoman MSS as follows: Vat. Ar. 195 (IX/XV century) includes the āyah endings in two different figures: Three dots in triangle-shaped in red ink or in inverse comma-formed. The numbers of the āyahs are not written in this manuscript. On the other hand, the earlier features of the present muṣḥafs found in this manuscript as follows: Waqfsigns are in red ink; the word sajdais written in the same line with the sajdaāyah in black ink. The word ḥizbis in the margin of the pages. The sūrah headings hold the name of the sūrah, Meccan-Medinan knowledge, and the numbers of āyahs. The taʿqībaword is at the end of the pages. Among these manuscripts, Barb. Or. 72 (X/XVI century) contains, for the first time, the prayer text after the reading the whole Qurʾān (khatm) at the end of the muṣḥaf. This manuscript has different explanations for the Meccan and Medinan knowledge. It uses “ نزلت بمكة ” for “ مكية ”, and “ نزلت بالمدينة ” for “ مدنية ”. The figures of juzʾare written in numerical form in Borg. Ar. 184 (XI/XVII century). The divisions such as “ ربع حزب, نصف حزب ” can be seen in the manuscripts in XII/XVIIIcenturies. The names of the sūrah in the sūrah headings can be different from their widely-known names. The 39 sūrahs have different names among the manuscripts examined in this article. The names of sūrahs which cannot be found in the relevant classical source as follows: al-Khalīlfor Sūrah Ibrāhīm; al-kharīrfor Sūrah al-Sajda; al-sayyāḥūnfor Sūrah Sabaʾ;jādalafor Sūrah Mucādala; al-ʿishārfor Sūrah al-Takwīr;wa’l-layli idhāyaghshāfor Sūrah al-Shams;lumazafor Sūrah al-Humaza; miskīnfor Sūrah al-Māʿūn;asrāfor Sūrah al-Isrāʾ;al-maqābirand al-qabrfor Sūrah al-Takāthur; salāsilāfor Sūrah al-Insān; al-abrārfor Sūrah al-Muṭaffifīn. The sūrah headings indicate the knowledge of Meccan-Medinan classification of the sūrahs. Each manuscript does not have this feature. However, the manuscripts have this feature may not include this knowledge for each sūrah headings. The disagreements about the Meccan or Medinan sūrahs in theʿulūm al-Qurʾānliterature can be seen in the manuscripts studied in this article. The manuscripts which have this knowledge present that the 47 sūrahs recorded only as Meccan, but the remaining ones both Meccan and Medinan. These manuscripts do not record a sūrah only as Medinan. There are manuscripts which present more detailed knowledge on Meccan-Medinan. Vat. Ar. 1484 (IX/XV century) mentions not only whether a sūrah is Meccan or Medinan but also the exceptional verses if the sūrah has. For instance, the heading of Sūrah al-Anʿām reads that: “ سورة الانعام نزلت جملة واحدة بمكة الا ثلث ايات انزلت بالمدينة قوله قل تعالوا أتل ما حرم ربكم عليكم لعلكم تتقون ”. Among the sūrah headings which have this feature are al-Naḥl, al-Ḥajj, al-Shuʿarāʾ, Luqmān, al-Sajda, and al-Zumar. Vat. Ar. 1588 mentions only the numbers of exceptional verses. For example, the heading of Sūrah al-Isrāʾsays that “ مكية و قيل مدنية غير ثلث ايات ”. Vat. Ar. 1597 contains details about the numbers of ayahs, words, and letters in the sūrah headings. For instance, for Sūrah al-Nisāʾ, it reads that “ اياتها ق ع اختلافها ب كلماتهاغج ذ م ه حروفها غيول ”. The Arabic letters in this explanation has a numerical value (abjad). According to this the number of āyahs is 170, the number of debated ones in merging with the previous and next verses is 2, the number of words 3.745, and the number of letters is 16.030. There are corrections on the pages of the manuscripts. These corrections may be done through the writing process or during the check reading (muqabala) at the end of the writing. The writing of the text by heart and by looking to the other copy, and the similarities may cause these kinds of errors for the scribe. Studying on Qurʾān manuscripts reveals the different features of the writing of a muṣḥaf. Even though the numbers of the graduate studies gradually increase in Turkey, there is no a PhD dissertation which analyzes a Qurʾān manuscript, and only one M.A. thesis has been recently completed. Therefore, establishing graduate courses on Qurʾān manuscripts in the field of Islamic studies will strengthen the Qurʾānic and tafsīrstudies. (shrink)

The scales across which physical properties exist are vast and subtle in their effects on particular systems placed locally on such scales. For example, human experiential access is restricted only to partial segments of the mass density, size, and temperature scales of the universe. I argue that philosophers must learn to appreciate better the effects of physical scales. Specifically, thought experiments in philosophy should be more sensitive to physical scale effects, because the conclusion of a thought experiment may be undermined (...) by unintentionally ignored scale effects, and the changes required to obtain the foreground state of affairs in a thought experiment might require unacknowledged scale-spanning changes to the contextual background. I discuss four philosophical thought experiments: Putnam's Twin Earth and Brain in a Vat, Searle's Chinese Room, and Chalmers's Zombies Without Qualia. I close by briefly defending the greater interest and importance of physical possibility over logical possibility. (shrink)

Panmicropsychism is the view that the fundamental physical ingredients of our universe are also its fundamental phenomenal ingredients. Since there is only a limited number of fundamental physical ingredients, panmicropsychism seems to imply that there exists only a small set (palette) of basic phenomenal qualities. How does this limited palette of basic phenomenal qualities give rise to our rich set of experiences? This is known as ‘the palette problem’. One class of solutions to this problem, large-palette solutions, simply denies that (...) the palette is limited. These solutions assume that all types of phenomenal qualities (color, sound, odor, taste, etc., and presumably also types not experienced by humans) were created fully formed at the birth of our universe. On this view, brains evoke conscious experiences by sampling primordial, preexisting phenomenal spaces. My main claim in this paper is that, by analogy with the mathematical description of the fundamental physical ingredients of our universe, which exhibits simplicity, symmetry, and beauty, panmicropsychists should expect the mathematical description of the fundamental phenomenal ingredients of our universe to exhibit similar features. The goal of this paper is to exemplify this claim using what is arguably the simplest of all types of phenomenal qualities—color. Specifically, I utilize phenomenological data on color to construct the maximally symmetric mathematical description of phenomenal color space. I then show that this mathematical description is isomorphic to the mathematical description of two-state quantum systems in a mixed state. Based on this isomorphism, I suggest that color may be the phenomenal dual aspect of two-state quantum systems. (shrink)

An inquiry into the possibility that life?after?death be understood as waking from a shared dream into the real world. Attempts to outlaw the possibility that ?really? we are, e.g., vat?brains are shown to lead to unwelcome, anti?realist conclusions about either the world or consciousness. The unsatisfactory nature of empirically observable (Humean) causal connections suggests that real causes may be found beyond the world of our present experience. Though such a story cannot now be proved to be true, we are entitled (...) to entertain it as a serious possibility. An attempt is made to say what life is like in the ?Real World?, whether this be a spatial world like our present one or not, and what moral it holds for our present life. I suggest (like Plato) that there are many levels of waking, and that our ?Real Self should not be identified simply with our present egos. (shrink)

Consider three answers to the question of what it actually is for you to be aware of the room you are in. It is for the room in a way to exist. It is for there to be only physical activity in your head, however additionally described. It is for there to be non-spatial facts somehow in your head. The first theory, unlike the other two, satisfies five criteria for an adequate account of consciousness itself. The criteria have to do (...) with the seeming nature of this consciousness, and with subjectivity, reality including non-abstractness, mind-body causation, and the differences between perceptual, reflective and affective consciousness. The theory of consciousness as existence is not open to the objection having to do with a deluded brain in a vat. The theory, as any theory of consciousness needs to, explains its own degree of failure in characterizing consciousness. It releases neuroscience and cognitive science from nervousness about consciousness, and leaves all of consciousness a subject for science. The theory is a reconstruction of our conception of consciousness. It may be that we should carry forward several theories of consciousness. But they will have to be compared in terms of truth to the five criteria for an adequate theory. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Self-Predication and the "Third Man" Argument ROGER A. SHINER 1.1. IN COMMPm'mO on the 'Third Man' Argument (TMA), Proclus z produces the following line of thought. He argues that. if the relation of resemblance between Form and particular were symmetrical, the argument in question would be valid; the relation is not, however, symmetrical. Where a Form and particular are both alike, have the quality of likeness, the likeness of (...) that which is derived is not the same as the likeness of that from which it is derived, just because of the former's derivatory nature. Consequently, ~k tt~v ala01]x~ bttotoi3c0at ~re[vot~ (sc. xo~ ~Semv), abx~ 8~ xo6~ot~ oSr~xt, 'the sensible particulars resemble the Forms, but they are not in the same relation of resemblance to the particulars' (ibid., 913.29-30). That is to say, the bare relation of similarity may be symmetrical, but the relation of a similar copy to a similar original is not; the copy is 'a copy of' the original, but the original/s not 'a copy of' the copy. This way of defending the Theory of Forms against the TMA I shall for purposes of identification call the 'Ontological Defence'. It lays stress on the ontological difference between Form and particular in order to avoid the fatal implication that the relation between them is symmetrical. If we use the language of predication, the point is as follows: the TMA is valid, if the Forms have a given term predicated of them severally in exactly the same sense as it is predicated of their respective dependent particulars. This, however, is not the case, for the quality in virtue of which a given term is predicated of a given Form differs in ontological status from the quality in virtue of which that term is predicated of that Form's dependent particulars. Thus we see that underlying the Ontological x I am grateful for helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper to Professor Gilbert Ryle, Professor John F. Malcolm and two anonymous readers for this Journal. Since this paper went to press, the following relevant articles have appeared: G. Vlastos, "'Self Predication' in Plato's Later Period," Philosophical Review, LXXVIII (1969), 74-78, and "Plato's 'Third Man' Argument (Parm. 132al-b2): Text and Logic," Philosophical Quarterly, XIX (1969), 289-301; K. W. Rankin, "The Duplicity of Plato's Third Man," Mind, LXXVIII (1969), 178-197; T. O. Smith, "'The Theory of Forms, Relations and Infinite Regress," Dialogue, VIII (1969), 116-123. 2 Proelus, In Platonis Parmenidem, ed. V. Cousin, Paris, 1864; 912.27 ft. [3711 372 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY Defence is the following assumption--the fact that the Forms are self-predicating only causes problems for the Theory of Forms, if a given Form F and its corresponding particulars, a set of f things, have 'F' predicated of them univocally, are F in precisely the same sense. My thesis in this paper is that this latter assumption is false, it is, rather, quite sufficient for the Self-Predication Assumption (SPA) to be vicious, if 'F' is predicated of both Form and particular not equivocally. This is not the same as 'univocally', and furthermore it is not possible that Plato could have thought of the predication of a term of both Form and particular as equivocal, the only alternative left to him to escape the TMA. The SPA, therefore, is required for the Theory of Forms to make sense, and leads to an ineradicable defect in that Theory. 1.2. One minor terminological point must be noted before we proceed. There are two versions of the TMA in the Parmenides; the first runs from 131eS-132b2, and the second from 132c11-133a7. The second of these explicitly employs the language of copy-resemblance, 7mpdS~tytm ('paradigm'), 6lxoio)tta ('likeness'), ~tKao0~vat ('resemble') as an explication of ~t~0e~tq ('participation'): the first employs the lan~.,uage of cttx6 ~ xai3xa.., eIvat ('that by which things are...'), which, as Plato has already indicated (Phaedo 100d6-8), is deliberatety noncommittal as to the relation between Forms and particulars. I shall refer to the first argument as TMA(1) and the second... (shrink)

In response to a suggestion in the Class. Rev. , the two MSS. of the Liber Glossarum preserved at Tours have recently been examined. Since they had not been seen by Goetz when he published his excerpts, the following short descriptions may be added to the introduction of Vol. V. of the Corpus Glossariorum Latinorum: 1. Tours, Bibliothèque de Ville, MS. No. 850; end of the ninth century; foll. 493, of which 1, 491, 492 are mere corners; cmm. 49 by (...) 29. The last item is an Isidore gloss, Zatenen.-gemmam. Gaps due to loss of folia occur between Abiectus and Abdolet; Dextera manus and Dialogus; Faber and Impulitum; Res diuinae and Samsacus. There are no corrections except between folia 197 and 300, where a thirteenth-century hand has checked the MS. by means of another copy of the Lib. Gloss. The items are drawn up in two columns, and the alphabetical arrangement agrees for the most part with that of Vat. Pal. lat. 1773. Marginal indications of the sources of the items are numerous except between Profanum and Remeantes; where two or three neighbouring items come from the same source, the marginal mark is repeated; and towards the end of the MS., where the scribe takes to writing two items in the same line, the indication is also carefully transferred. This is important in view of Goetz' theory that the source of an unlabelled item is that given by the last preceding label. (shrink)

In response to a suggestion in the Class. Rev., the two MSS. of the Liber Glossarum preserved at Tours have recently been examined. Since they had not been seen by Goetz when he published his excerpts, the following short descriptions may be added to the introduction of Vol. V. of the Corpus Glossariorum Latinorum: 1. Tours, Bibliothèque de Ville, MS. No. 850; end of the ninth century; foll. 493, of which 1, 491, 492 are mere corners; cmm. 49 by 29. (...) The last item is an Isidore gloss, Zatenen.-gemmam. Gaps due to loss of folia occur between Abiectus and Abdolet; Dextera manus and Dialogus; Faber and Impulitum; Res diuinae and Samsacus. There are no corrections except between folia 197 and 300, where a thirteenth-century hand has checked the MS. by means of another copy of the Lib. Gloss. The items are drawn up in two columns, and the alphabetical arrangement agrees for the most part with that of Vat. Pal. lat. 1773. Marginal indications of the sources of the items are numerous except between Profanum and Remeantes; where two or three neighbouring items come from the same source, the marginal mark is repeated; and towards the end of the MS., where the scribe takes to writing two items in the same line, the indication is also carefully transferred. This is important in view of Goetz' theory that the source of an unlabelled item is that given by the last preceding label. (shrink)

What ethical questions does neuroscience raise and help to answer? Neuroethics blends philosophical analysis with modern brain science to address central questions within this growing field: · Is free will an illusion? · Does brain stimulation impair a patient's autonomy? · Does having a mental disorder excuse bad behavior? · Is addiction a brain disease? · Should we trust our gut feelings in ethics and politics? · Should we alter our brains to become better people? · Is human reasoning bound (...) to be biased by our values? · Can brain science be trusted to read the minds of criminals and consumers? This book provides an opinionated tour through captivating cases and a close examination of the philosophical issues and scientific evidence. Joshua May's lively and accessible writing style makes it an indispensable resource for students and scholars in both the sciences and humanities. (shrink)

Increasing numbers of decisions about everyday life are made using algorithms. By algorithms we mean predictive models (decision rules) captured from historical data using data mining. Such models often decide prices we pay, select ads we see and news we read online, match job descriptions and candidate CVs, decide who gets a loan, who goes through an extra airport security check, or who gets released on parole. Yet growing evidence suggests that decision making by algorithms may discriminate people, even if (...) the computing process is fair and well-intentioned. This happens due to biased or non-representative learning data in combination with inadvertent modeling procedures. From the regulatory perspective there are two tendencies in relation to this issue: (1) to ensure that data-driven decision making is not discriminatory, and (2) to restrict overall collecting and storing of private data to a necessary minimum. This paper shows that from the computing perspective these two goals are contradictory. We demonstrate empirically and theoretically with standard regression models that in order to make sure that decision models are non-discriminatory, for instance, with respect to race, the sensitive racial information needs to be used in the model building process. Of course, after the model is ready, race should not be required as an input variable for decision making. From the regulatory perspective this has an important implication: collecting sensitive personal data is necessary in order to guarantee fairness of algorithms, and law making needs to find sensible ways to allow using such data in the modeling process. (shrink)

The research described here contributes to the extant empirical research on business ethics education by examining outcomes drawn from the literature on positive organizational scholarship (POS). The general research question explored is whether a course on ethical decision-making in business could positively influence students’ confidence in their abilities to handle ethical problems at work (i.e., moral efficacy), boost the relative importance of ethics in their work lives (i.e., moral meaningfulness), and encourage them to be more courageous in raising ethical problems (...) at work even if it is unpopular (i.e., moral courage). Specifically, the study used a rigorous quasi-experimental pretest–posttest research design with a treatment (N = 30) and control group (N = 30) to investigate whether a graduate-level course in business ethics could influence students’ levels of moral efficacy, meaningfulness, and courage. Findings revealed that participants in the business ethics treatment course experienced significant positive increases in each of the three outcome variables as compared to the control group. The largest increase was in moral efficacy, followed by moral courage, and finally, moral meaningfulness. These findings are discussed in the context of the current research on business ethics education and POS. Implications for future research are discussed. (shrink)

As a highly consequential biological trait, a memory “bottleneck” cannot escape selection pressures. It must therefore co-evolve with other cognitive mechanisms rather than act as an independent constraint. Recent theory and an implemented model of language acquisition suggest that a limit on working memory may evolve to help learning. Furthermore, it need not hamper the use of language for communication.

Edgington has proposed a solution to the sorites paradox in terms of ‘verities’, which she defines as degrees of closeness to clear truth. Central to her solution is the assumption that verities are formally probabilities. She is silent on what verities might derive from and on why they should be probabilities. This paper places Edgington’s solution in the framework of a spatial approach to conceptualization, arguing that verities may be conceived of as deriving from how our concepts relate to each (...) other. Building on work by Kamp and Partee, this paper further shows how verities, thus conceived of, may plausibly be assumed to have probabilistic structure. The new interpretation of verities is argued to also help answer the question of what the verities of indicative conditionals are, a question which Edgington leaves open. Finally, the question of how to accommodate higher-order vagueness, given this interpretation, is addressed. (shrink)

This paper consists of four parts. Part 1 is an introduction. Part 2 evaluates arguments for the claim that there are no strict empirical laws in biology. I argue that there are two types of arguments for this claim and they are as follows: (1) Biological properties are multiply realized and they require complex processes. For this reason, it is almost impossible to formulate strict empirical laws in biology. (2) Generalizations in biology hold contingently but laws go beyond describing contingencies, (...) so there cannot be strict laws in biology. I argue that both types of arguments fail. Part 3 considers some examples of biological laws in recent biological research and argues that they exemplify strict laws in biology. Part 4 considers the objection that the examples in part 3 may be strict laws but they are not distinctively biological laws. I argue that given a plausible account of what distinctively biological means, such laws are distinctively biological. (shrink)

This paper argues that the value of genetic-relative family health history information and the notion that lack of this information is a disadvantage can be established through its role as a nested goal in comprehensive life projects independent of documentation of particular health outcomes. Health information often plays a significant role in a person's formulation of life goals and projects, as well as in identification of plausible effective means to realize these goals. If health outcomes are valuable in part because (...) of the nested role these play in the successful realization of a person's life projects and goals, then other, similarly nested contributors to such success must also be valued on a similar scale. Some of these other contributors to a successful life may themselves be nested with health considerations, as illustrated in the relationship that will be the focus of this paper. Health information --independent of outcomes per se – influences relationships, reproduction, and the formulation of plausible comprehensive life goals in intricate and very influential ways. Although such information may be valued in part because it is predictive of health outcomes, this relationship does not reduce such information, nor the comprehensive life goals and projects such information promotes, to health outcomes. That is, while health status can both enhance and detract from the autonomous pursuit of life projects formulated in the context of health information, the value and weight of these projects is independent of particular health status or outcomes, even while in part shaped by them. (shrink)

Let T be the standard Veblen 1908 ordinal notation system for Γ0 as defined, for example, in Schütte's 1977 textbook [13] on Proof Theory. We define a slight modification of the standard assignment of fundamental sequences for the limit ordinals in T and prove that Γ0 is subrecursively inaccessible for this assignment, i.e. the induced slow and fast growing hierarchy match up at Γ0 for the first time.The results of this paper also indicate that φε00 may be considered as a (...) new slow growing ordinal of PA in the sense that the induced slow growing hierarchy up to φε00 classifies the PA-provablyrecursive functions.We show how the results of this paper can be used to bui d a subrecursive hierarchyover the predicative ordinals in the spirit of Wainer's 1970 abstract [16 ]. (shrink)

We argue that, under the usual assumptions for sufficiently strong arithmetical theories that are subject to Gödel’s First Incompleteness Theorem, one cannot, without impropriety, talk about *the* Gödel sentence of the theory. The reason is that, without violating the requirements of Gödel’s theorem, there could be a true sentence and a false one each of which is provably equivalent to its own unprovability in the theory if the theory is unsound.

This text brings together a a number of contributions that discuss issues surrounding and informing questions such as: what is the social?; in what ways can we know it?; and how can our findings be validated? Topics discussed include: the relationship of philosophical and research issues to each other; the nature of social reality; properties that may be ascribed to the social; research accounts and rhetorical persuasion; and the relations between gender and knowing. The overall concern of the book is (...) to clarify how and in what ways we can claim to know the social world and what implications and consequences this may have for social scientific practice. (shrink)

AbstractOrganizations receive multiple benefits when their members act ethically. Of interest in this study is if the actors receive benefits as well, especially as individuals look to work to fulfill psychological and social needs in addition to economic ones. Specifically, we highlight a series of ongoing ethical practices embodied in professional moral courage and their relationship to actor’s work meaningfulness and life well-being. Drawing on self-determination theory and affective events theory, we explore how exercising professional moral courage in one’s work (...) leads to positive work and life outcomes. Data from 106 administrative staff of non-profit organizations demonstrates the positive benefits of adopting ethical practices at work. Specifically, professional moral courage is found to be significantly related to both work meaningfulness and individual eudaimonic life well-being. Our findings note positive benefits for individuals who incorporate professional moral courage into their daily lives and provide support for organizations seeking to encourage it from their employees; benefits for organizations and employees go beyond just the gains from ethical behavior into other positive psychological processes. Implications for future work that considers both the psychological and normative approaches to meaningful work are discussed. (shrink)

Psychologically faithful deep neural networks (DNNs) could be constructed by training with psychophysics data. Moreover, conventional DNNs are mostly monocular vision based, whereas the human brain relies mainly on binocular vision. DNNs developed as smaller vision agent networks associated with fundamental and less intelligent visual activities, can be combined to simulate more intelligent visual activities done by the biological brain.

Descartes's greatest glory was to be the first to articulate, and systematically to defend, the new scientific ideal of explanation in terms of lawfulness. For the realm of matter, lawful connections replaced anthropomorphic volitions as the model of rational explanation. Descartes's use of explanation in terms of lawfulness, inspired by Galileo's beginnings in this enterprise, was vindicated by Newton's subsequent achievement. Replacement of anthropomorphic agency, by causal mechanism, as the explanatory model, was undoubtedly the most profound of the many effects (...) of the new science on our culture. (shrink)

In this critical notice of Gerald Gaus's The Order of Public Reason, I reject two arguments Gaus advances for the claim that social moral rules must be publicly justified.

According to epistemic two-dimensionalism, every expression is associated with two kinds of meaning: a primary intension (a “Fregean” component) and a secondary intension (a “Russellian” component). While the rst kind of meaning lines up with the speaker’s abilities to pick out referents of correctly employed expressions in hypothetical scenarios, the second kind of meaning is a version of what standard semanticists call “semantic content”—a kind of content which does not pivot on speaker abilities. Despite its conciliatory temperament, epistemic two-dimensionalism has (...) come under recent attack. It has been alleged that it is bound to attribute to speakers a priori identifying knowledge of the referents of correctly employed terms, and bound also to reject valid rules of inference such as exportation: P(a) → λx[P(x)](a) (see, e.g., Soames 2005. (shrink)

This article explores Mencius’s virtue-oriented ethics and its metaphysical foundation for resources they can provide to transgenerational communities. Mencius’s ethics offers moral norms for human actions that transcend those generations with whom they can interact and impact generations of people in the future. These actions range from the preservation of traditional values to the challenges of climate change, offering grounds for transgenerational justice. Mencius’s account of virtues offers a moral justification for the standards of living that are common to all (...) human beings, justifying their entitlements to certain economic, social, cultural, and environmental conditions for the cultivation of moral virtues that perfect human nature. Due to his view that the metaphysics of human nature also governs the cosmic world, the virtues that govern good human relationships will also protect the world’s natural resources, regardless of whether someone subscribes to a Confucian community. (shrink)

This open themed issue of Etikk i praksis compiles five diverse papers that overlap at key conceptual intersections around trust, care and responsibilities across national boundaries. Our globalized social environments have become more and more complex, and the information needed to understand society and our moral responsibilities have grown ever more challenging. The ‘fake news’ buzzword, used by various societal actors to cast doubt on political rivals, is shaking the trust needed to be confident about institutional sources of information. The (...) caring attitude that serves to cement social groups and communities seems to be weakening in certain contexts, resulting in individual acts of unimaginable violence that shock us to the core. On the other hand, we are inspired when the same caring attitude mobilizes groups and individuals to reach across national boundaries and aid those who are suffering. In sorting through the generalizations and attempts to categorize the many highly complex social phenomena that occur in our interconnected global realities, we apply careful analysis of both facts and values that facilitate ethical reflection, helping us to make ethical decisions. (shrink)

There has been much argument over whether procreative selection is obligatory or wrong. Rebecca Bennett has recently challenged the assumption that procreative choices are properly moral choices, arguing that these views express mere preferences. This article challenges Bennett's view on two fronts. First, I argue that the Non-Identity Problem does not show that there cannot be harmless wrongs – though this would require us to abandon the intuitively attractive ‘person-affecting principle’, that may be a lesser cost than abandoning some more (...) firmly-held intuition. But, even if we accept Bennett's claim that these choices are not moral, that does not show them to be mere personal preferences. I argue that there is a class of non-moral ‘categorical preferences’ that have much the same implications as moral preferences. If a moral preference for able-bodied children is problematic, then so is a non-moral categorical preference. Thus, showing that these preferences are not moral does not show that they are not problematic, since they may still be categorical. (shrink)

Rhythm is key to language acquisition. Across languages, rhythmic features highlight fundamental linguistic elements of the sound stream and structural relations among them. A sensitivity to rhythmic features, which begins in utero, is evident at birth. What is less clear is whether rhythm supports infants' earliest links between language and cognition. Prior evidence has documented that for infants as young as 3 and 4 months, listening to their native language supports the core cognitive capacity of object categorization. This precocious link (...) is initially part of a broader template: listening to a non-native language from the same rhythmic class as and to vocalizations of non-human primates provide English-acquiring infants the same cognitive advantage as does listening to their native language. Here, we implement a machine-learning approach to ask whether there are acoustic properties, available on the surface of these vocalizations, that permit infants' to identify which vocalizations are candidate links to cognition. We provided the model with a robust sample of vocalizations that, from the vantage point of English-acquiring 4-month-olds, either support object categorization or fail to do so. We assess whether supervised ML classification models can distinguish those vocalizations that support cognition from those that do not, and which class of acoustic features best support that classification. Our analysis reveals that principal components derived from rhythm-relevant acoustic features were among the most robust in supporting the classification. Classifications performed using temporal envelope components were also robust. These new findings provide in principle evidence that infants' earliest links between vocalizations and cognition may be subserved by their perceptual sensitivity to rhythmic and spectral elements available on the surface of these vocalizations, and that these may guide infants' identification of candidate links to cognition. (shrink)

I argue that our best science supports the rationalist idea that, independent of reasoning, emotions aren’t integral to moral judgment. There’s ample evidence that ordinary moral cognition often involves conscious and unconscious reasoning about an action’s outcomes and the agent’s role in bringing them about. Emotions can aid in moral reasoning by, for example, drawing one’s attention to such information. However, there is no compelling evidence for the decidedly sentimentalist claim that mere feelings are causally necessary or sufficient for making (...) a moral judgment or for treating norms as distinctively moral. I conclude that, even if moral cognition is largely driven by automatic intuitions, these shouldn’t be mistaken for emotions or their non-cognitive components. Non-cognitive elements in our psychology may be required for normal moral development and motivation but not necessarily for mature moral judgment. (shrink)

In a well-ordered society, democratic officials face an assurance problem. They want to ensure that others will act reasonably when they do the same. According to political liberals, public reason can solve this problem, but the details of how assurance is generated are unclear. This article explains the assurance mechanism in political liberalism. Apart from public reason, mutual assurance is also provided by a long-term record of civic deeds. By performing civic deeds over time, officials signal their reasonableness to each (...) other. This record of civic deeds is costly to unreasonable officials and thus represents a reliable way to differentiate trustworthy fellows from others. The article also shows that a recent critique of political liberalism, which argues that public reason is merely cheap talk and thus political liberalism fails to provide mutual assurance, misses the point. It overlooks that assurance is created through talks and deeds together. (shrink)

The rhetoric of disgust is common in moral discourse and political propaganda. Some believe it's pernicious, for it convinces without evidence. But scientific research now suggests that disgust is typically an effect, not a cause, of moral judgment. At best the emotion on its own only sometimes slightly amplifies a moral belief one already has. Appeals to disgust are thus dialectically unhelpful in discourse that seeks to convince. When opponents of abortion use repulsive images to make their case, they convince (...) few, even if they rally their base. When champions of animal rights show graphic depictions of the torturous conditions of animals in factory farms, they convince only those previously ignorant of the severity of such conditions. Ultimately, disgust may be less pernicious than it is useless. (shrink)